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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

MARY JANE REECE PHILLIPS, ,.
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
WENDELL BENNETT, Adm. of the )
Estate of ONEITA S. WOLFE, deceased,
Defendant and Respondent.

CASE
NO. 11010

APPELLANT'S IRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This appeal is taken by the Appellant from the judgment of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
in and for Ut:ah County, State of Utah.

BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant is of the opinion that the trial court
erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard payment
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of plaintiff's medical expenses by a third party, and that
such failure to instruct was prejudicial error. Appellant
seeks a new trial.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Is it prejudicial error for a trial court to allow in eVldence the payment of medical benefits by plaintiff's in·
surer and to refuse an instruction to the jury that such
evidence must not be considered in evaluating plaintiff's
damages?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 10, 1964, appellant, Mrs. Phillips, a resident of Springville, Utah, was involved in an automobile
collision at Fourth South and State Street in Provo, Utah.
Respondent ran his automobile into the back of appellant's
car causing damage to the car and personal injuries to
appellant. The day following the accident, app2llant reported to Dr. N. 0. Parker of Springville for treatment of
pain in her neck and back regions. After a series of visits
by the appellant to his office, Dr. Parker referred appellant to Dr. E. H. Chapman, an orthopedic surgeon practicing in Provo, Utah, for further treatment. Dr. Chapman placed the appellant in Utah Valley Hospital, which
hospitalraation continued from January 20 to January 27,
of 1965. Although released from the hospital, appellant
continued to e~perience pain and suffering as a result of
her injury.
On March 11, 1965, appellant was involved in a very
minor accident in which she backed her automQlbile into a
utility pole at a grocery store. She reported the accident
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t'J Dr. Chapman at his office the next day.

Mrs. Phillips
te;.;tified that the second accident was of minor consequence, that while she had a temporary inflammation of
r1er condition it shortly returned to the condition which
!Jrevailed before the second accident and that she continued
at the plateau of recovery reached from her first injury
!Page 20 of the Record). Dr. Chapman stated that he
did not attach great significance to the second accident
a.nd that substantially all of the appellant's injuries occw-red in the first accident (Page 62 of Record).
Cowl.sel for the defendant in his argument to the jury
emphasized the second accident. The substance of his ario;w m·nt was that one could not adequately apportion as betwet'n the first and second accident the damages occurring
subsequent to the second accident. Consequently, he ar~;wxl, the jury should award the appellant only those expenses and general damages sustained subsequent to the
first, but prior to the second accident. It was his calcubtion that the appellant had sustained only damages of
$410.54 as follows:

Exhibit #
2

N. L. Parker, M.D.
(Professional Services 11/11/64-1/13/65)

35.00

;j

J. R. Monnahan, M.D.
(X-Ray Services 11/18/64)

25.00

4

Utah Valley Hospital
(Hospitalization 1/20/65-1/27/65)

8

E. H. Chapman, M.D.
(Professional Services 1/14/65-1/27/65)

9

Deon's, Inc.
(Cervical Pillow)

263.50
55.00
6.16

4

10

Deon's, Inc.
(Traction Device)

25.88
$410.54

Counsel for plaintiff, arguing that in view of the minor
nature of the second accident all plaintiff's medical and
hospital expenses should be included, calculated additional
special damages as follows:
Exhibit #

5 Utah Valley Hospital

(Physical Therapy and Related Services
4/2/65---5/7/67)

7

Utah Valley Hospital
(Hospitalization 9/16/66-9/25/66)

8

E. H. Chapman, M.D.
(Professional Services 3/12/65-6/30/67l

Add Defendant's Calculation:

$424.50

372.25
84.00
$410.54

$1291.29
There were thus two theories of special damages
given, respectively, $410.54 and $1291.29. Disregarding
this evidence, however, the jury brought back a verdict
of special damages in the amount of $500.00 (See page 73
of the Record).

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT THEY WERE NOT TO CONSIDER
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OR HOSPITAL BENEFITS PAID BY BLUE
CROSS-BLUE SHIELD OR ANY OTHER THIRD PAR~tr:DICAL

TY.
During the course of the trial, it became necessary to
introduce hospital records, which records had notations
reflecting payment by Blue ~ (Exhibits 4, 5 and 7).
At the time these records were introduced in evidence,
appellant's counsel had an off the record conference with
the court and respondent's coWlSel concerning the necessity of an instruction to the jury as to how to treat these
' records in the light of such notations The court requested
counsel for the app2llant to submit an instruction for its
consideration, which was done at the beginning of the second day of trial.
Afte-r both sides had rested, counsel for the appellant
argued the merits of submitting requested instructions
· relating to payments by a third party to the jury, but the
court refused the request. It is submitted that this refusal was error on the part of the Judge and was so prejudicial in its nature that a new trial should be granted to
the appellant.
It is a well settled rule of law that the amount recov' erable by an injured person in a tortious personal injury
case is not decreased by the fact that the injured party
has been wholly or partly indemnified for the loss by P~
ceeds from accident insurance. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Staley, 28 Cal 2d 347, 170 P 2d 448, 166 ALR 198 (recogrtiling mle). Peri v. Los Angeles Junction Railroad Co.,
'.J3 Cal 2d 111, 137 P'2d 441. This universally accepted
rnle, often called the "collateral source" rule, applies to
virtually all types of insurance: Health and accident in-

surance, Farb v. Borsuk, 205 Misc 448, 128 NYS:.Zct 41~
'1954); Joiner v. Fort, 226 SC 249, 84 SE2d 719, (1954);
Campbell v. Sutliff 193 Wis 370, 214 NW 374 (1927); HoJ.
pitalization, Gersick v. Shilling, 97 Cal App 2d 641, 218 P2d
583 (1950); Roth v. Chatlos, 97 Conn 282, 116 A 332 (19L2J;
Workman's Compensation Insurance, Sheffield Co. v Phil·
lips, 69 Ga App 41, 24 SE2d 834 (1943); Coker v. FiveTwo Taxi Service, Inc., 211 Miss 820, 52 So 2d 356 (1951).
The above cited Gersick case was an automobile accident case, similar to the case at bar. On cross-examma·
ti.on defendant's counsel, over objection, was permitted to
elicit from plaintiff the information that most of her hos.
pital bills had been paid by Blue Cross, with whom she
had a policy, and that she had drawn $460.00 from the
United States Employment Service for disability. The Appellate Court held that it was error to h:ive admitted this
testimony. It further noted that total or partial compensation received by an injured party from a collateral
source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer, does not operate to reduce the damages recoverable from the wrongdoer. The court then went on to note that in thi~ rat·
ticular case the Judge had remedied his error by fully,
fairly and properly instructing the jury that if the jury
found defendant liable, plaintiff was entitled to recover
for all expenses incurred, and that the amount of damag.cs
should not be reduced by amounts paid by third parties in
respect of the damage. Gersick, supra, 218 P2d at 589.
This kind of instruction was refused in the case at bar.
thus providing no safeguard against prejudicial use of the
evidence by the jury.
The reasoning of the Gersick case was followed in
the recent Hickenbottom v. Jeppeson, 300 P2d 689, 14:1
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CA 2d 115.

Therein the defendant was similarly allowed

to elicit from the plaintiff upon cros.s-examination the fact

that her insurance company had paid a large meastll'e of

her personal injury expenses. Again the Appellate Court
stated, "THOSE QUESTIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE
B£EN ALLOWED". (emphasis added). Again, however,
serious prejudice was avoided by giving proper instruction
to the jury that they were not to take into consideration
the fact that plaintiff's insurance company had paid a perc:entage of her damages. Again, there is no such exonerating instruction to the jury in the case at bar. Consistent with the authorities there is but one recourse: that
is tu declare the admisfficm of evidence of Blue C~-Blue
Shield coverage reversible error.
In her arguments to the court in respect to the appellant' s requested instructions which were submitted to
the cowt in the alternative, the appellant contended that
the jury was likely to believe that the appellant had been
reimbursed for the sum she sought as special damage and
was seeking to m:~over twice. They would be prone to
believe she was greedy and was deliberately misleading
the court and jury by not advising them that she had been
paid once, and that she was seeking to be paid twice for
the same injury. In the absence of correct instruction,
the jury might also conclude from the evidence as to payment by the insurer of special damages that appellant's
claim for general damages was exaggerated and as a result
significantly reduce general damages as well. Without ben1•fit of the tendered instructions, the jury was almost certc1inly prejudiced against the appellant by the introduction
of th~ hospital records indicating payment from a third
SOUrce.
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The fears e-'Cpressed by counsel in arguing for the
requested instructions are confirmed by the judgment. Ap.
pellant had conclusively proven that she had been severely
injured, that she had sustained a 10 percent permanent
disability as related to total body function and that her
injuries were substantially the result of the first accident.
It is, therefore, probable that the jury would have found
substantially greater damages had they not been exposed
to the evidence complained of, or had they received proper
instruction.
POINT 2
THERE IS NO BASIS IN FACT FOR THlE JURY
TO HAVE RETURNED A VERDICT OF $500.00 Af5
SPECIAL DAMAGES.
A VERDICT IN THIS AMOUNT DEMONSTRATES
THAT THE JURY FAILED TO CONSIDER TI-IE EVI·
DENCE AND WERE MOTIVATED BY PASSION, BIAS
AND PREJUDICE.
A comparison of the calculations of special damage

by the parties reveals that the finding of the jury was unrelated to the proof submitted. The amount arrived at
by the jury can neither be supported from the plaintiff's
view of the facts, nor from the defendant's view of the
facts. The verdict with respect to special damages must
have been either $410.54 or $1291.29. By no rational cal·
culation based on the evidence could the jury have arrived
at the figure of $500.00. It is respectfully submitted that
the figure was arrived at arbitrarily by the jury and probably represented a token offered to the plaintiff in view
of payments by a third party. The amount given by the
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jwy appears to be somewhat related to the amount of

unpaid by Blue Cross-Blue Shield. It is not
unlikely that the jury arrived at its figure by deducting
from appellant's total special damages an amount equivalent to that which was paid by Blue Cross-Blue Shield.

expenses

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff-appellant respectfully urges the Court to grant
her request for a new trial on the grounds: (1) that the
trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction regarding payments by a third party was prejudicial and
reversible error and (2) that there was no basis in fact
for an award of special damages in the amount given.

Respectfully submitted,
HOWARD AND LEWIS
JACKSON B. HOW ARD
Attorneys for Appellant
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah

